This report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. As the nation's most technologically advanced service, the Air Force relies absolutely on cyberspace to perform its war-fighting missions. Underpinning this competency is the ability to command and control cyberspace operations, something the authors argue is in need of a fresh approach if the Air Force is to effectively fly, fight, and win in cyberspace.
The authors assert that the lack of an effective cyberspace C2 structure critically reduces the responsiveness to combatant and joint task force commanders and increases the difficulty of integrating cyberspace capabilities into operational plans and execution. The traditional military hierarchies currently used for cyberspace C2 do not have the agility to deal with the high velocity of change that characterizes cyberspace. Instead, the authors argue for flexible organizational structures to match the complexity and pace of the cyberspace operational environment.
The central thesis of this paper is that any approach to cyberspace command and control must be founded on the nature of the cyberspace domain itself. To investigate this proposal, this study examines possible alternatives for cyberspace C2 that are based on the nature of the strategic environment, the nature of the cyberspace domain itself, and the way in which conflict must be approached in this domain in order to improve the armed forces' ability to successfully compete in cyberspace. The paper provides background on the pertinent threats arising in cyberspace; the definition of cyberspace; and the nature of the strategic environment, cyberspace, and competition in cyberspace. Next, a review of C2 models and associated organizational forms, including the current DOD approach, is presented. A set of cyberspace C2 criteria is then derived, followed by an analysis of the models in light of the criteria. Using the results of the analysis, implications for C2—with particular emphasis on organizational structure—are addressed.
The authors assert that the lack of an effective cyberspace C2 structure critically reduces the responsiveness to combatant and joint task force commanders and increases the difficulty of integrating cyberspace capabilities into operational plans and execution. The traditional military hierarchies currently used for cyberspace C2 do not have the agility to deal with the high velocity of change that characterizes cyberspace. Instead, the authors argue for flexible organizational structures to match the complexity and pace of the cyberspace operational environment.
The central thesis of this paper is that any approach to cyberspace command and control must be founded on the nature of the cyberspace domain itself. To investigate this proposal, this study examines possible alternatives for cyberspace C2 that are based on the nature of the strategic environment, the nature of the cyberspace domain itself, and the way in which conflict must be approached in this domain in order to improve the armed forces' ability to successfully compete in cyberspace. The paper provides background on the pertinent threats arising in cyberspace; the definition of cyberspace; and the nature of the strategic environment, cyberspace, and competition in cyberspace. Next, a review of C2 models and associated organizational forms, including the current DOD approach, is presented. A set of cyberspace C2 criteria is then derived, followed by an analysis of the models in light of the criteria. Using the results of the analysis, implications for C2—with particular emphasis on organizational structure—are addressed.
