This volume is from 1919.
Be sure to look for other books by this author:
"The Principles of Hindu Ethics"
"The Spirit of Ancient Hindu Culture"
...............................................................................
Summary from the book's Introduction:
The age in which we live is distinguished in many ways by its
realism. In the realm of "the practical" there is a wide spread
impatience amongst the educated against the dominance of
traditional ideas tending to limit the scope of enjoyment of
the good or to sacrifice concrete experience for the sake
of abstractions. In the realm of thought itself there has
been and is a decided revolt against the over emphasis of
abstract universal principles as distinct from actual particulars
withe their individual characteristics. This attitude is more or
less common in relation to all branches of thought: its signifi-
cance for ethics is especially important. Men ask that the
reflections of moral philosophers shall have some real and
important bearing on the problem of what the moral life
should contain and how it should be lived. Ethics is
required to have a definite and intimate relation with the
individual details of morality and not to remain in the
discussion of the purely formal. From the spirit of Kant
ethics now turns again to the spirit of Aristotle.
Though the view that the good cannot be defined has
incidentally been implied at various times in the history of
moral philosophy, it is only within recent years that its
true import has begun to be realised. In the first place
it involves that moral experience is immediate, that the
knowledge included in any science of ethics, though it
may be knowledge by description, is dependent upon
knowledge by direct acquaintance. Moral good is known
in some form of intuition, and is intelligible only in terms
of itself. In the second place it has become more and
more evident that all attempts to explain moral good in
a general manner, e.g. as duty, or as that which brings
the greatest amount of pleasure, or as the way of
deliverance, or as self-realisation, and so on, are of
only secondary value and importance.
The chief result of these modern tendencies with relation
to the science of ethics is to make it much more empirical.
In the ethics of the past there has been much keen discussion
of abstract principles and ultimate problems but too often
this discussion has had little relation to the ethical facts of
actual life. The attempt to bring about a closer relation
has involved a superimposition of the principles upon
actual conduct as it were from without. In consequence
the conceptions of the moral ideal have almost all lacked
content, have, in fact, been conspicuous by their poverty.
As Spinoza in order to give an account of substance had
to pass almost immediately to the attributes of
thought and extension and then in order to explain
these had to pass on to modes, thus eventually taking
in the immediate experiences of actual life, so ethical
writers in order to bring their conceptions into touch
with facts have been forced back to particular experiences.
From these only can we begin if we wish for an under-
standing of what the moral life includes in detail. In other
words, the science of ethics must be regarded as a
natural science concerned with the data of moral life.
...............................................................................
Contents:
Part I
1. The Available Zoroastrian Literature
II. The Historical and Social Conditions
III. Psychological Conceptions
PART II
IV. The General Moral Attitude
V. The Value of Life : Industry and Indolence
VI. Truthfulness and Deceit: Purity and Impurity
VIL The Ethics of Sex Relations
VIII. Benevolence : Other Vices and Virtue
IX. The Ethical in Legal Preference in Zoroastrian Literature
X. Theological and Metaphysical Conceptions
Be sure to look for other books by this author:
"The Principles of Hindu Ethics"
"The Spirit of Ancient Hindu Culture"
...............................................................................
Summary from the book's Introduction:
The age in which we live is distinguished in many ways by its
realism. In the realm of "the practical" there is a wide spread
impatience amongst the educated against the dominance of
traditional ideas tending to limit the scope of enjoyment of
the good or to sacrifice concrete experience for the sake
of abstractions. In the realm of thought itself there has
been and is a decided revolt against the over emphasis of
abstract universal principles as distinct from actual particulars
withe their individual characteristics. This attitude is more or
less common in relation to all branches of thought: its signifi-
cance for ethics is especially important. Men ask that the
reflections of moral philosophers shall have some real and
important bearing on the problem of what the moral life
should contain and how it should be lived. Ethics is
required to have a definite and intimate relation with the
individual details of morality and not to remain in the
discussion of the purely formal. From the spirit of Kant
ethics now turns again to the spirit of Aristotle.
Though the view that the good cannot be defined has
incidentally been implied at various times in the history of
moral philosophy, it is only within recent years that its
true import has begun to be realised. In the first place
it involves that moral experience is immediate, that the
knowledge included in any science of ethics, though it
may be knowledge by description, is dependent upon
knowledge by direct acquaintance. Moral good is known
in some form of intuition, and is intelligible only in terms
of itself. In the second place it has become more and
more evident that all attempts to explain moral good in
a general manner, e.g. as duty, or as that which brings
the greatest amount of pleasure, or as the way of
deliverance, or as self-realisation, and so on, are of
only secondary value and importance.
The chief result of these modern tendencies with relation
to the science of ethics is to make it much more empirical.
In the ethics of the past there has been much keen discussion
of abstract principles and ultimate problems but too often
this discussion has had little relation to the ethical facts of
actual life. The attempt to bring about a closer relation
has involved a superimposition of the principles upon
actual conduct as it were from without. In consequence
the conceptions of the moral ideal have almost all lacked
content, have, in fact, been conspicuous by their poverty.
As Spinoza in order to give an account of substance had
to pass almost immediately to the attributes of
thought and extension and then in order to explain
these had to pass on to modes, thus eventually taking
in the immediate experiences of actual life, so ethical
writers in order to bring their conceptions into touch
with facts have been forced back to particular experiences.
From these only can we begin if we wish for an under-
standing of what the moral life includes in detail. In other
words, the science of ethics must be regarded as a
natural science concerned with the data of moral life.
...............................................................................
Contents:
Part I
1. The Available Zoroastrian Literature
II. The Historical and Social Conditions
III. Psychological Conceptions
PART II
IV. The General Moral Attitude
V. The Value of Life : Industry and Indolence
VI. Truthfulness and Deceit: Purity and Impurity
VIL The Ethics of Sex Relations
VIII. Benevolence : Other Vices and Virtue
IX. The Ethical in Legal Preference in Zoroastrian Literature
X. Theological and Metaphysical Conceptions
